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ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF ANTE-MORTEM 
PROBATE AND PROCEDURAL DUE 
PROCESS LIMITATIONS ON 
SUCCESSION 
Gregory S. Alexander* and Albert M. Pearson**t 
Ante-mortem probate stands as a significant recent development 
in the American law of wealth succession.1 It confronts a problem 
that seriously impairs our probate system, the depredatious will con-
test,2 and promises to help revitalize the probate process. Already 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia. B.A. 1970, University of Illinois; 
J.D. 1973, Northwestern University. - Ed. 
•• Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia. B.A. 1969, Birmingham-Southern 
College; J.D. 1972, Vanderbilt University. - Ed. 
t The authors wish to acknowledge their indebtedness to Richard V. Wellman, Lawrence 
W. Waggoner, and Eugene F. Scoles for their co=ents on various drafts of this Article. 
l. In light of modern attacks on the probate system, e.g., N. DACEY, How To Avom PRO-
BATE (1965), and Bloom, The Mess in Our Probate Courts, READER'S DIG., Oct. 1966, at 102, it 
is easy to overlook that probate reforms, such as the Uniform Probate Code, are not purely 
contemporary. They may be directly traced to earlier work, beginning with the suggestions in 
Atkinson, Old Principles and New Ideas Concerning Probate Court Procedure, 23 J. AM. JUD. 
SocY. 137 (1940), and Atkinson, Wanted-A Model Probate Code, 23 J. AM. JUD. SocY. 183 
(1940), and continuing through the Model Probate Code. L. SIMES & P. BASYE, PROBLEMS IN 
PROBATE LAW, INCLUDING A MODEL PROBATE CODE (1946) [hereinafter cited as MODEL PRO-
BATE CODE]. Hence it is accurate to characterize the probate reform movement as evolution-
ary rather than revolutionary. Scoles, Probate Reform, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY 
PROPERTY 136, 139 (E. Halbach ed. 1977). Nevertheless, the Uniform Probate Code has had a 
catalyzing effect on the reform movement, as a survey of the recent literature indicates. See, 
e.g., Crapo, The Uniform Probate Code - .Does It Really Work?, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 395; 
DuPont, The Impact of the Uniform Probate Code on Court Structure, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 375 
(1973); Parker, No-Notice Probate and Non-Intervention Administration under the Code, 2 
CONN. L. REV. 546 (1970); Straus, Is the Uniform Probate Code the Answer?, 111 TR. & EsT. 
870 (1972); Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: Blueprint far Refarm in the 70's, 2 CONN. L. 
REV. 453 (1970); Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: A Possible Answer to Probate Avoid-
ance, 44 IND. L.J. 191 (1969); Zartman, An Illinois Critique of the Uniform Probate Code, 1970 
u. ILL. L.F. 413. See generally R. WELLMAN, L. WAGGONER & 0. BROWDER, PALMER'S 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRUSTS AND SUCCESSION 2-17 (3d ed. 1978). 
2. The characterization of will contests as "depredatious" accurately suggests how will 
contests frequently function in the contemporary probate system. As Langbein observes, 
"most [capacity litigation] is directed toward provoking pre-trial settlements, typically for a 
fraction of what the contestants would be entitled to receive if they were to defeat the will." 
Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 77 MICH. L. REV. 63, 66 (1978). The 
magnitude of the social problem presented by compromise-seeking will contests is indicated by 
the number and variety of devices estate planners use to mitigate the effect of such contests. 
These include revocable inter vivas trusts, see note 23 i'!fra, adoption, in terrorem clauses and 
designated heirship. As Langbein notes, however, these devices are only imperfect responses 
to the problem. Ante-mortem probate offers a direct remedy. For a recent discussion of the 
destructive consequences of will contests, their effect on family relationships, and the conse-
quent incentive to avoid the probate system, see Alford, Some Major Problems in Alternatives 
to Probate, 32 REC. ASSN. B. CITY N.Y. 53, 58-60 (1977). 
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enacted in several states3 and currently under active study by the 
Joint Editorial Board of the Uniform Probate Code and the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,4 ante-
mortem probate is likely to be widely implemented in some form. 
But while legislators and academics alike support ante-mortem pro-
bate as a general idea, 5 disagreement has emerged over the specific 
form it should take. 
A recent exchange in the Michigan Law Review6 offered two al-
ternative schemes for ante-mortem probate, both of which contem-
plate a procedural design materially different from that of the few 
existing ante-mortem probate statutes. That new design was termed 
the conservatorship model, contrasting with the more traditional 
contest model. The exchange reflected a disagreement over what the 
authors assumed to be an unavoidable trade-off between two objec-
tives: protection against post-mortem strike suits, and confidentiality 
of a will's contents during the testator's lifetime. The exchange did 
not, however, explore the possibility of an ante-mortem probate 
scheme that would achieve both objectives. What made these objec-
tives appear incompatible was the assumption that any version of 
ante-mortem probate that would preclude post-mortem attacks on 
the will must necessarily provide due process protective features, re-
quiring notice to all expectant heirs and legatees under earlier wills 
and the opportunity for them to appear in the proceeding. 
In this Article, we shall challenge that assumption and propose a 
workable scheme of ante-mortem probate that both protects the tes-
tamentary plan against strike suits and preserves the confidentiality 
of the plan during the testator's lifetime. Section I reviews the con-
servatorship model as developed by Professor Langbein and identi-
fies its objectionable features. In Section II, we address the general 
constitutional question of what property interests command due 
process protection. This context poses the constitutional problem 
narrowly, but our analysis has broad implications regarding consti-
tutional notice requirements for any probate reform. Concluding in 
that Section that due process does not compel notice and a right to 
3. Arkansas Ante-Mortem Probate Act of 1979, Senate Bill No. 234; Omo REV. CODE 
ANN.§§ 2107.081-.085 (Page Supp. 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 30.1-08.1 (Supp. 1977). 
4. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, JOINT EDITO-
RIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, UNIFORM ANTE-MORTEM PROBATE ACT (3d 
Working Draft, April 18, 1978). The National Conference voted last summer to initiate study 
toward a Uniform Ante-Mortem Probate Act. 
5. See Alford, Book Review, 14 GA. L. REV. 146, 148 (1979). 
6. Langbein, supra note 2, and Alexander, The Conservatorship Model: A Mod!ftcalion, 77 
MICH. L. REV. 86 (1978). 
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appear for expectant heirs and legatees, we prepare in Section III an 
administrative design for a no-notice version of ante-mortem pro-
bate. Our discussion anticipates prudential objections to the model, 
offering a possible exception to the no-notice provisions to favor the 
nuclear family, an exception we ultimately reject. 
l. THE CONSERVATORSHIP MODEL REVIEWED 
A. Outline of the Model 
The conservatorship model responds to defects in the present 
American version of living probate. As currently conceived and en-
acted, ante-mortem probate employs ·an adversarial format: the tes-
tator institutes a declaratory judgment action in the appropriate 
court,7 naming past and present beneficiaries and all expectant heirs 
at law as parties. The petition requests a judgment declaring that the 
will satisfies the formal requirements of execution and that the testa-
tor possesses testamentary capacity and is free from undue influence. 
Unless subsequently revoked or amended,8 a will that has success-
fully survived this proceeding is immune from post-mortem contest 
by anyone.9 
Under this format, ante-mortem probate is. essentially an acceler-
ated will contest.10 Of course, circumstances may alter considerably 
between the ante-mortem hearing and succession, through changes 
in the benefited class or the extent and value of the testator's prop-
erty. In view of such uncertainties, potential heirs and legatees can-
not calculate in ante-mortem probate whether it is in their interests 
to claim defects in the will. Without that knowledge, they are un-
7. Jurisdiction to probate wills in the majority of states rests in separate courts, variously 
termed surrogates' court (New York), orphans' court (Pennsylvania), or the court of ordinary 
(until recently, Georgia). In other states the court of general jurisdiction, such as a circuit 
court, has jurisdiction over probate matters, including the appointment of executors and ad-
ministrators and supervision of estate administration. The classic treatment of these matters is . 
Simes & Basye, The Organization of the Probate Court in America (pts. 1 & 2), 42 MICH. L. 
REv. 965, 43 MICH. L. REv. 113 (1944), reprinted in MODEL PROBATE CODE, supra note 1, at 
385 (1946). 
8. For revocation or modification of court-approved wills, the Ohio and North Dakota 
ante-mortem probate statutes require a formal proceeding, including a hearing before the 
court that originally reviewed the will, on the validity of the revocation or modification. OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN.§ 2107.084(C) (Page Supp. 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 30.1-08.1-03 (Supp. 
1977). 
9. Declarations of a will's validity are directly appealable, but they are not subject to col-
lateral attack. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2107.084(E) (Page Supp. 1978). The findings are 
not controlling, however, on issues for which there was no opportunity to litigate in the ante-
mortem proceeding. Thus, the probate decree may be set aside on a showing of fraud upon the 
court in obtaining the order. See Fink, Ante-Mortem Probate Revisited· Can an Idea Have Life 
Afler .Death?, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 264, 277 (1976). 
10. Langbein, supra note 2, at 74. 
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likely to incur legal costs and endanger family harmony by asserting 
the will's invalidity. 11 Yet, the contest model relies on heirs and leg-
atees to raise issues of testamentary capacity. The conservatorship 
model resolves this problem of ripeness by adopting the procedural 
apparatus currently used to protect the interests of incapacitated in-
dividuals: 12 The court appoints a guardian ad litem to represent all 
persons whose eventual property interests might be harmed by suc-
cessful scrutiny of the will. 13 Any concerned heirs or legatees may 
discreetly protect their interests by informing the guardian ad litem 
of their objections to the proffered will, avoiding an open contest 
between family members, or they may choose to contest on their 
own. 
This model's procedure substantially mirrors the specifications 
for actual conservatorship in the Uniform Probate Code.14 The tes-
tator would attach the executed will to a petition for a court declara-
tion of testamentary capacity. The expectant heirs at law and all 
beneficiaries named in the proffered will and in past wills have the 
right to notice and an opportunity to appear in the probate proceed-
ing. The guardian ad litem would have extensive powers of discov-
ery over matters of capacity and undue influence.15 A doctor would 
examine the testator, and the medical report would be freely avail-
able to the court, the guardian ad litem, and any other litigant. The 
proceeding itself would be relatively informal: the evidence would 
be aired in a nonadversarial context, and the judge would determine 
capacity without a jury. The testator would be required, however, to 
be represented by counsel. Finally, this conservatorship model im-
poses no special requirements for revocation or amendment of a cer-
tified will; that is, the existing rules on revocation and alteration 16 
11. Langbein, supra note 2, at 73-74. 
12. To protect the person or property of a physically or mentally incompetent individual, 
the court having protective jurisdiction may appoint a guardian. The terminology varies con-
siderably from state to state. The Uniform Probate Code [hereinafter cited as U.P.C.] refers to 
the guardian of an adult's property as a "conservator,'' U.P.C. §§ 1-201(6), 5-401(2), and re-
stricts the term "guardian" to persons appointed to protect the nonproprietary interests of inca-
pacitated individuals. U.P.C. §§ 1-201(16), 5-312. Article V of the U.P.C., which deals with 
protective proceedings, fundamentally changes both the basic concept of property guardian-
ship and the specific procedures of conservatorship. For example, the conservator is given the 
same title to the property of the protected person that a trustee would have, U.P.C. § 5-420, 
and he is granted broad powers of management that can be exercised without court order, 
U.P.C. § 5-424. These and other provisions reflect the Code's general attempt to reduce court 
supervision of fiduciaries wherever possible. 
13. That is, a determination that a will is free from defects in execution, testamentary ca-
pacity, or undue influence. 
14. U.P.C. §§ 5-403 to -407. 
15. These powers are also discussed in Langbein, supra note 2, at 79. 
16. See generallyT. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS§§ 84-87 (2d ed. 1953), 
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would fully apply to wills probated ante-mortem, with no provision 
either for court supervision or for notice to the court or any individ-
ual. 
B. Flaws in the Model 
In an earlier critique, 17 one of us criticized the Langbein model 
of ante-mortem probate for incorporating specific features that many 
testators are likely to find unattractive. We shall review and develop 
those points so that we may develop an ante-mortem probate scheme 
that most improves upon existing methods of wealth transmission. 
The efficacy of ante-mortem probate as a response to nonmerito-
rious will contests depends substantially on the extent of its use by 
testators who are likely subjects of such attacks. 18 Two features of 
the Langbein model may deter testators from using it: It requires 
that the will be attached to the public petition and it provides notice 
and an opportunity to appear to all expectant heirs and legatees. By 
exposing the will's contents and imposing extra costs, these features 
jeopardize ante-mortem probate as a reform measure. 
1. .Disclosure of the Terms of the Will 
Requiring that the testator attach the will to a public petition 
while at the same time granting notice and the opportunity to appear 
in the proceeding to all heirs apparent and persons who would be 
legatees under previous wills sacrifices confidentiality of the will's 
contents. Testators under this procedure risk disclosing their testa-
mentary plans to individuals for whom they have made no provision 
or a less generous provision than anticipated. Armed with this 
knowledge, potential contestants can better calculate their monetary 
incentives to claim genuine or :fictitious defects in the will, 19 but the 
trier may well doubt whether any challenge is motivated by true 
doubt of capacity rather than by disappointment with the will's 
17. Alexander, supra note 6,passim. 
18. As Professor Fink observes, ante-mortem probate is obviously directed at the testator 
who feels "apprehensive about the security of his or her bequests." Fink, supra note 9, at 289. 
Such a testator is most likely an elderly person who has made substantial bequests to charita-
ble institutions or nonrelatives who might be regarded as unnatural beneficiaries. Fink pro-
vides some notable examples of such testators. Id at 265 n. l. 
19. Even with complete knowledge of the will's contents, however, calculation of the value 
of contesting the will remains imperfect. As we noted in Section I.A., inheritance interests are 
not settled until the testator's death. Yet potential contestants may well assume that if the 
testator is elderly - as he is likely to be - the succession plan incorporated in a will that he 
offers for ante-mortem probate represents the testator's final thinking. He is not likely later to 
benefit individuals for whom little or no provision is made in a will that is probated ante-_ 
mortem. 
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terms. Such circumstances increase the probability of error on the 
question of capacity. Moreover, the testator's costs in the proceeding 
increase if every assertion of incapacity must be rebutted, however 
ill-founded. If questioned, capacity would be more accurately deter-
mined in ignorance of the personal stakes involved. That same igno-
rance of the will's terms would eliminate the threat of strike suit, 
occurring under the Langbein model at the ante-mortem rather than 
the post-mortem stage. 
In addition to its effects on the quality of the procedure, testators 
are likely to rebel against disclosure's effects on social ties. It is usu-
ally thought desirable to maintain the privacy of the testator's plans 
until death. In conventional, post-mortem probate, the contents of 
the will are normally disclosed to family members and to interested 
parties, but the testator's personal relationships have ended. In the 
ante-mortem format, however, these relationships continue after the 
probate proceeding, and disclosure of the will's contents may seri-
ously impair them. Although the public's access to the will may eas-
ily be limited by a condition that only members of the family and 
other persons having a specific interest in the estate will receive no-
tice of the proceeding and have access to the proffered will,20 the 
testator may desire that the will remain secret from acquaintances, 
from remote relatives who might qualify as expectant heirs at law, 
20. The notice provisions of the Uniform Probate Code serve this purpose. See, e.g., 
U.P.C. §§ 1-201(20), 3-204, 3-306. See generally R. WELLMAN, L. WAGGONER & 0. BROW-
DER, supra note 1, at 344-49. 
Professor Langbein recommends that "[t]he liberal provision for notice and right of ap-
pearance in existing conservatorship practice should be carried over to Conservatorship Model 
living probate." Langbein, supra note 2, at 78. The unique features of conservatorship merit 
comment. Section 5-404 allows "any person who is interested in [the protected person's] estate 
to petition for a protective order, including appointment of a conservator. Section 5-405 leaves 
the scope of required notice to the court's determination once persons who have filed a request 
for notice under § 5-406 have been notified. Thus, § 5-405 does not prescribe mandatory no-
tice to all persons affected by the protected person's estate, because not many of those who do 
not request notice will have a significant legal interest. Probably most of the persons consid-
ered interested by§ 5-404 are creditors. Individuals who lack such a direct and present propri-
etary stake in the affairs of the protected persons are not deemed interested persons, and notice 
is not mandatory for them. The protected person, who is also notified of the proceedings, 
normally represents those whose interest is non proprietary; hence notice is usually unnecessary 
for such persons. In this connection, the Code distinguishes between the constitutionally re-
quired notice given to the protected person and prudential notice that may be given to others 
who are related to the protected person in such a way that they may assist in the protection, 
The U.P.C. provisions dealing with notice in conservatorship do not contemplate an ante-
mortem probate proceeding. The class of persons interested in the protected person is different 
in the two contexts. In conservatorship, notice must be provided to protected persons because 
they are the interested parties within each estate. Beyond them, not many persons are then 
interested (technically) in the estate, so that notice to them covers most technical interests. In 
ante-mortem probate, only the testator who initiates the proceeding has a technical interest in 
the.estate, so notice is constitutionally unnecessary. No other individuals have interests com-
parable to that of the protected person in conservatorship that are at stake in the ante-mortem 
probate procedure. 
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and even from members of the nuclear family. By notifying inter-
ested persons and giving them the right to appear in a proceeding 
that publicizes the will, the conservatorship model plainly sacrifices 
the testator's privacy. 
2. The Costs of Notice 
Providing notice to every interested person, as required in all ex-
isting versions of ante-mortem probate including Professor 
Langbein's, will aggravate the costs of the procedure and may well 
impair its efficiency. A court may consider it necessary to require 
extensive proof of heirship or other bases of interest to determine 
who should be notified and allowed to appear. Since the court must 
notify those persons who will become heirs upon the testator's death, 
it must reach more than those who would immediately appear to be 
heirs, if it is to avoid being underinclusive. The determination of 
that class will make the notice requirement even costlier than it is 
under conventional probate procedure. Furthermore, the task of sat-
isfying the requirement may distract the court from the main objec-
tive of the procedure. 
The notice requirement may also impair the guardian ad litem's 
discovery. Although the burden of complying with the notice re-
quirement will technically rest on the testator, the guardian may con-
sider it prudent to monitor such compliance before initiating 
discovery. And the guardian who monitors such broad notice provi-
sions may pay less attention to the essential task of investigating in-
capacity and undue influence. An ante-mortem probate model 
should avoid such byways that might distract the court and the 
guardian from the central issue of capacity. 
The threat to the efficacy of ante-mortem probate posed by the 
disadvantages outlined here - the social effects of premature disclo-
sure of the will's contents and the added complications and costs of 
the notice requirement - is even more apparent when this proce-
dure is compared with alternative methods of protecting dispositive 
plans, notably the revocable trust. By making and preserving a pri-
vate record to demonstrate capacity and the absence of outside influ-
ence, individuals who might otherwise use ante-mortem probate can 
substantially achieve their goal through a revocable living trust. 
Wealth transfers effected through such trusts are generally immune 
from the perils of testamentary proof.21 They are rarely upset on the 
21. See J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' 
EsTATES AND TRUSTS 481 (4th ed. 1977). 
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basis of incapacity or undue influence, largely because the settlor is 
available to defend the transaction and the trust is usually well es-
tablished when the settlor dies. Thus, unusual provisions, which 
might trigger a contest if included in a will, usually escape compro-
mise proceedings, and the plan is implemented as originally in-
tended. Moreover, revocable living trusts preserve privacy since 
they are free from the inventory and accounting procedures of the 
probate court.22 These features suggest why the revocable living 
trust is such a popular dispositive device and why many individuals 
would not be willing to sacrifice simplicity and confidentiality to use 
the conservatorship model of ante-mortem probate.23 
Professor Langbein and others24 have apparently assumed that 
any version of ante-mortem probate that leads to a binding determi-
nation necessarily includes notice and appearance provisions, entail-
ing substantive disclosure of the will. In light of the disadvantages of 
such provisions, that assumption is worth testing; a binding proceed-
ing that does not involve notice and disclosure would preserve all of 
the advantages of the conservatorship model without sacrificing fea-
tures of conventional probate that many testators regard as indispen-
sable. 
II. DUE PROCESS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY, AND PROBATE 
Until recently, the dominant procedural model for the probate of 
22. J. FARR, AN EsTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK§ 14, at 93 (3d ed. 1966). 
23. We do not suggest that revocable inter vivos trusts solve the problem of compromise 
contests. Such trusts can be successfully attacked on grounds of incapacity and undue influ-
ence, and the vulnerable individual may wish to obtain complete assurance that his plan will 
not be upset. Revocable inter vivos trusts are also weakened by the possibility of involuntary 
modification or termination by a surviving spouse, as in Krause v. Krause, 285 N.Y. 27, 32 
N.E.2d 779 (1941), but see In re Halpern, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951), and occasion• 
ally by creditors. See generally Schuyler, Revocable Trusts - Spouses, Creditors and Other 
Predators, 8 U. MIAMI INST. EsT. PLAN.~ 74.1300 (1974). 
The possibility of extending the ante-mortem procedure to revocable trusts bears consider-
ation. Such trusts could be secured from subsequent attacks on grounds of incapacity or un-
due influence in the same way as wills. The functional similarities between revocable trusts 
and wills is well known, provoking questions about the testamentary character of such trusts 
and the need to comply with typical Wills Act formalities. At the same time, however, the 
conclusion in many cases that the power to revoke does not render dispositions in the trust 
testamentary, e.g., National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E.2d 113 (1944), may 
suggest that the interests taken by beneficiaries under such trusts are materially different than 
the expectancy interests of heirs or legatees under pending wills. Such a difference would 
complicate an extension of our procedure to revocable trusts. Moreover, the similarities be-
tween bases for contesting wills and revocable trusts have not been thoroughly and rigorously 
studied. More needs to be known about the points of similarity and difference between these 
two devices before any suggestion is made to extend ante-mortem procedures to revocable 
trusts. 
24. MODEL PROBATE CODE, supra note I, at 20; Fink, supra note 9, at 276; Langbein, supra 
note 2, at 78. 
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wills and administration of estates has required prior notification of 
the proceedings to all interested persons.25 But the appearance of the 
Uniform Probate Code has renewed interest in developing proce-
dures for no-notice probate and unsupervised administration to sim-
plify the transfer of property at death.26 Most of the academic 
commentary has found the no-notice feature· incompatible with con-
stitutional due process requirements,27 supposing that any form of 
ante-mortem probate is, like conventional probate procedures, sub-
ject to the notice and appearance obligations of the fourteenth 
amendment due process clause.28 This premise reflects two assump-
tions. First, it assumes that early Supreme Court precedent sus-
taining no-notice, common form probate stands on an outmoded 
view of in rem proceedings and the procedural due process require-
ments applicable to them.29 Second, it assumes that the status of 
expectant heir at law or potential beneficiary under current or for-
mer wills confers a constitutionally protected property interest. 30 We 
25. Simes, The Function Of Will Contests, 44 MICH. L. REV. 503, 524 (1944). A 1952 study 
of probate in common form found that 17 states did not require notice before the probate of a 
will. Levy, Probate in Common Form in the United States: The Problem of Notice in Probate 
Proceedings, 1952 W1s. L. REv. 420, 422. There have been relatively few changes in notice 
requirements since then. Many of the states that do employ some type of summary probate 
procedure also provide that notice of the appointment of a personal representative and of 
probate of a will be given to interested parties or to the legal heirs after the proceeding. 
26. The Uniform Probate Code provides opportunities for probate and administration by 
private arrangement, U.P.C. §§ 3-102, 3-107, 3-108, 3-1006, art. 3, General Comment, and 
informal probate procedures that do not require judicial supervision, U.P.C. §§ 3-301, 3-302 
and Comment. A similar scheme was incorporated in the Pennsylvania Probate Estates and 
Fiduciary Code, adopted in 1972. See Straus, Pennsylvania Falls in Line, UPC NOTES, March 
1979, at I, 10. But cf. Levy, supra note 25, at 433 (noting that few states had dropped their 
notice requirements in response to the Model Probate Code). 
27. E.g., Note, The Constitutionality of the No-Notice Provisions of the Uniform Probate 
Code, 60 MINN. L. REV. 317 (1976). 
28. E.g., Fink, supra note 9, at 276, 283-87. The notable exception is Cavers, Ante Mortem 
Probate: An Essay In Preventive Law, I U. CHI. L. REV. 440 (1934), but his failure to include 
provision for notice should perhaps not be overemphasized since he did not directly address 
the notice question and since due process notions have evolved rather substantially since he 
wrote. 
29. See, e.g., Christianson v. King County, 239 U.S. 356, 373 (1915); Farrell v. O'Brien, 
199 U.S. 89 (1905); Robertson v. Pickrell, 109 U.S. 608 (1883); Case of Broderick's Will, 88 
U.S. (21 Wall.) 503 (1874); Darby's Lessee v. Mayer, 23 U.S. (IO Wheat.) 465 (1825). 
30. This assumption is reflected, for example, in recent reform efforts of the Kansas Judi-
cial Council Probate Law Study Advisory Committee. Using the U.P.C. and other modem 
probate laws as points of reference, the Kansas study and the resulting proposed legislation 
were directed at simplifying probate procedure. But, as a reporter for the Kansas Judicial 
Council indicates, the Advisory Committee regarded procedural due process requirements, 
especially those for notice, as serious restraints on the extent of reform measures that it could 
undertake. See Hearrell, Probate Law - A Study and Proposals, 1974 KAN. JUDICIAL 
COUNCIL BULL. 82, 89, 111-12. And those requirements were rigorously defined on the basis 
of recent Kansas decisions such as In re Estate of Barnes, 212 Kan. 502, 512 P.2d 387 (1973). 
See also Chapin v. Aylward, 204 Kan. 448,464 P.2d 177 (1970) (notice required in tax foreclo-
sure proceeding); Pierce v. Board of County Commrs., 200 Kan. 74, 434 P.2d 858 (1967) (no-
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will concede the first assumption for the sake of argument. A closer 
analysis of recent due process theory and precedent, however, 
reveals that the second assumption is unsupported and that due 
process does not compel notice provisions for ante-mortem probate. 
As we shall explain below, due process requires notice and a 
right to a hearing only when state action threatens one's liberty or 
property. A property interest may be legal ownership or a state-en-
dorsed entitlement. Inheritance through testate or intestate succes-
sion, however, is simply a state-supervised gift. Until the gift is 
completed, the expectant recipient has no greater property rights 
than the expectant recipient of an inter vivos gift. Under our probate 
system, the succession rights of expectant heirs and legatees do not 
receive formal legal recognjtion until (1) a will has been admitted to 
probate, or (2) the existence of a valid will has not been established 
and the establishment of any later discovered will is barred by law. 
Either of these eventualities initiates the state's duty to provide pro-
cedural due process protection to the succession rights that arise. 
Admittedly, lawyers typically pretend that such rights exist from the 
time of the testator's death, using the legal fiction of relation back; 
but that fiction serves administrative considerations subsidiary to 
and dependent upon the outcome of probate proceedings.31 Those 
tice required in tax foreclosure proceeding); Note, supra note 27, at 324-28; Comment, Notice 
Requirements in California Prohale Proceedings, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1111, 1118-19 (1978). 
31. This analysis concerning the time when testamentary transfers become effective does 
not conflict with the well-established rule of property law fixing the testator's death, not the 
completion of probate, as the time when interests transfer. That rule appears in a variety of 
contexts. Heirs and legatees, for example, normally are required to survive only the decedent's 
death, not the completion of probate proceedings. For the common law Rule Against Perpetu-
ities, the life in being must be alive at the testatdr's death; persons conceived or born between 
the testator's death and completion of probate cannot qualify as lives in being. For tax pur-
poses, too, the date of death is generally the relevant time. Thus, to qualify for the marital 
deduction under I.R.C. § 2056, an interest passing to the surviving spouse must be 11 
nonterminable interest as of the testator's death. See Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503, 
507-11 (1964). Moreover,'in determining whether a general testamentary power of appoint-
ment is in existence at the time of the donee's death for purposes of I.R.C. § 2401, some au-
thority suggests that the donee need not survive the probate of the donor's will, only the death 
of the donor, for the power to be includible in the donee's gross estate. Estate of Bagley v. 
United States, 443 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1971). In these situations and others, the idea that time 
of death is the relevant moment is implemented through the legal fiction of relation back, 
Even though the validity of a will, and hence the identity of legatees having property interests, 
usually cannot be determined at the decedent's death, we sometimes deem the interests as 
having passed at death. It is important to recognize, however, the purposes served by the 
relation-back fiction, because the time when testamentary transfers are deemed effective may 
vary according to the purpose of that determination. As the earlier examples illustrate, the 
relation-back fiction usefully serves the interests of administrative convenience and necessity. 
Where it is necessary to identify a certain moment when property interests transfer even 
though the transfers are not actually effective until the conclusion of probate, the time-of-death 
rule as rationalized by relation back is advantageous. But where those considerations are not 
present, the time-of-death rule is pointless. Thus, the timing of testamentary transfers for due 
process purposes should depend on the time of those transfers' practical effectiveness. As we 
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considerations are irrelevant to the due process analysis that follows. 
Two lines of argument are typically offered to require procedural 
due process safeguards for probate proceedings. The first argument 
extends the holding of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust 
Co. 32 to probate proceedings. The second, relying on the recent en-
titlement cases beginning with Goldberg v. Kelly,33 maintains that the 
right to inherit through either testate or intestate succession is a stat-
utorily recognized property interest and hence that any state action 
affecting that interest - whether judicial or administrative - trig-
gers requirements of the due process clause. 
Mullane overturned a New York statute requiring only notice by 
publication for the hearing of original accountings of a common 
trust fund. After refusing to classify the accounting procedure as an 
in rem or in personam proceeding, the Court concluded that publica-
tion alone was not a constitutionally adequate method of notice. 
Publication was sufficient for those beneficiaries whose whereabouts 
were unknown or whose interests were "either conjectural or future 
or, although they could be discovered upon investigation, do not in 
due course of business come to the knowledge of the common 
trustee."34 But, the Court held, present beneficiaries whose ad-
dresses were known must at least be notified by ordinary mail.35 
It is hardly surprising that the Mullane Court paid so little atten-
tion to the threshold question of the existence of a protectable prop-
erty interest: the parties did not dispute it. For present purposes, 
however, we shall probe further into the facts of Mullane to develop 
a more detailed view of the sweep of the Court's ruling. The inter-
ests of the trust beneficiaries in Mullane can be divided into two 
broad categories. One group of beneficiaries held a right to the pres-
ent use and enjoyment of the current earnings of the common trust 
fund while the other could enjoy benefits only after certain events 
predetermined in the trust instrument. Although indicating that the 
distinction between present and future interests might affect the form 
of notice, the Court in Mullane nevertheless extended due process 
protection to all trust beneficiaries whose interests were then in ques-
tion. 36 
discuss in the text, even after the death of the decedent, the effectiveness of testamentary trans-
fers remains uncertain until the conclusion of probate when the relevant succession track -
testate or intestate - is finally ascertained. 
32. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
33. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
34. 339 U.S. at 315-17 (quote at 317). 
35. 339 U.S. at 318. 
36. Our reading of Mullane may be unnecessarily generous. It is unclear whether the 
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The Mullane Court's extension of due process protection to some 
future and contingent interests does not mean, however, that similar 
protection extends to any person with sufficient imagination to con-
ceive of a series of events that might lead to rights in the property of 
another. The interests of the trust beneficiaries in Mullane, whether 
currently enjoyed or delayed subject to a contingency, have tradi-
tionally been deemed presently operative and have conventionally 
been distinguished from expectancies.37 They were fixed in form by 
the legal instruments creating the trusts in the first instance. These 
interests resulted from the settlor's private, consensual transfer of his 
personal rights in a way respected and regarded by law as immedi-
ately committing the donor and immediately giving the trustee du-
ties to the beneficiary, even though the donor may to some extent 
reserve or restrict the beneficiary's use and enjoyment of the trans-
ferred interests. The state's only involvement in the transaction was 
to establish the formalities for recognition and enforceability;38 it did 
Court regarded contingent remainders as constitutionally protected property interests. That 
question was not presented to the Court, since publication notice had been provided to contin-
gent remaindermen under the trusts. In other contexts, the distinction between vested and 
contingent remainders has been regarded as material for constitutional purposes. See 0. 
BROWDER & R. WELLMAN, FAMILY PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS: FUTURE INTERESTS 26 (1965), 
And nonvested future interests, including contingent remainders, reversions, and rights of en-
try, generally have received less protection against a variety of governmental acts, such as 
condemnation and tax sales. 0. BROWDER, L. WAGGONER & R. WELLMAN, FAMILY PROP• 
ERTY SETTLEMENTS: FUTURE INTERESTS 156-57 (2d ed. 1973). This distinction is reflected in 
various contexts. It appears, for example, in the traditional equitable jurisdiction to extinguish 
remote future interests when they no longer serve any socially useful purposes, see Baker v. 
Weedon, 262 So. 2d 641 (Miss. 1972), and in statutes that bar possibilities of reverter and rights 
of entry for the purpose of clearing land titles. Although the effect of these statutes may be to 
cut off interests that have not yet become possessory, they have been sustained against due 
process attack in a number of cases. E.g., Trustees of Schools v. Batdorf, 6 Ill. 2d 486, 130 
N.E.2d lll (1955). 
37. Under the co=on law rule of inalienability, contingent remainders and other 
nonvested future interests were regarded as functionally equivalent to expectancies. The com-
mon law rule has been largely abandoned, and the distinction between nonvested future inter-
ests and expectancies is now well recognized. "[T]he inalienability rule is based . . . on the 
now discredited notion that a contingent future interest is not a present property interest, but 
rather is one that might arise in the future." 0. BROWDER, L. WAGGONER & R. WELLMAN, 
EDITORS' COMMENTS To FAMILY PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS 10 (1974). See also l AMl!RICAN 
LAW OF PROPERTY§ 4.102 (AJ. Casner ed. 1952). 
38. Under the positivist view of procedural due process, property rights arise in three dis-
tinct ways: 1) the federal or state constitution provides for them; 2) the state confers property 
rights upon private parties, and 3) the state permits private parties to create property rights 
among themselves. Succession law, along with the law of contracts, trusts, and property, falls 
into the third category. The state's role there is to define what the property interest is and to 
set the prerequisites for recognition. 
The Supreme Court's recent debtor-creditor cases illustrate the relationship of such third 
category rights and procedural due process principles. In Mitchell v. W,T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 
600 (1974), for example, the Court accepted as a given the law of Louisiana concerning the 
property rights of the debtor and creditor. The buyer/debtor acquired not only a general 
ownership interest in the goods, subject to the vendor's lien, but also a possessory interest. 
Since both interests were recognized under state law, neither could be extinguished through 
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not purport to dictate the character of the benefit transferred or the 
categories of potential or eligible recipients. While the trust benefi-
ciaries in Mullane had no antecedent right to have property placed in 
trust for their benefit, they acquired judicially enforceable rights 
once that transfer occurred, and the state formally recognized those 
rights through its substantive law of trusts. Mullane forcefully estab-
lishes that the state cannot terminate or limit such rights in a binding 
judicial proceeding without first affording notice and an opportunity 
to appear to parties whose interests may be adversely affected. 
The relevance of Mullane to the question of whether and when 
procedural due process requirements attach in probate proceedings 
is limited not simply because Mullane did not involve a probate pro-
ceeding39 but also because the existence of a protectable property 
interest at the time of the trust accounting was so well recognized. 
The Court granted the effect of a judicial decree on the undisputed 
interests of the trust beneficiaries: "We understand that every right 
which beneficiaries would otherwise have against the trust company 
. . . for improper management of the common trust fund during the 
period covered by the accounting is sealed and wholly terminated 
•••• "
40 Reliance on Mullane to establish the same procedural due 
process requirements for the probate proceedings fails because the 
interests of the trust beneficiaries in Mullane are fundamentally dif-
ferent from those that the testator's legal heirs and legatees under 
current and former wills may assert in probate proceedings. 
The precise difference is between an interest that is a present le-
gal right and one that is no more than a hope or expectancy of a 
legal right. More specifically, quite unlike the trust beneficiaries in 
Mullane, the heirs at law and legatees named in any unprobated will 
have neither a traditionally enforceable interest in the testator's 
property nor a :fiduciary relationship with the property's custodian.41 
the state's adjudicatory mechanism without affording the buyer/debtor protection. Without 
formal legal recognition of these interests, the debtor's due process claim would presumably 
have failed. However, a necessary aspect of state recognition of property rights is specifying 
when they come into being. 
39. The applicability of Mullane to probate proceedings has been widely debated. See 3 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY§ 14.37 (AJ. Casner ed. Supp. 1958). 
Mullane has been held inapplicable in probate proceedings in several state courts. E.g., In 
re Pierce's Estate, 245 Iowa 22, 60 N.W.2d 894 (1953); Baker Natl. Bank v. Henderson, 151 
Mont. 526, 445 P.2d 574 (1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 530 (1969); Continental Coffee Co. 
v. Estate of Clark, 84 Nev. 208,438 P.2d 818 (1968); New York Merchandise Co. v. Stout, 43 
Wash. 2d 825, 264 P.2d 863 (1953). 
40. 339 U.S. at 311. 
41. Even as to those beneficiaries in Mullane whose interests were most contingent, the 
distinction between contingent remainders and expectancies is well settled. Moreover, the 
view that expectant heirs and legatees have no present property interests is familiar for private 
law purposes, see 0. BROWDER, L. WAGGONER & R WELLMAN, supra note 37, at IO, and it 
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To illustrate the distinction, consider inter vivos transfers of property 
by the testator. Such transfers generally are valid despite their ad-
verse effect on expectant heirs and legatees.42 Those individuals 
whose hopes are extinguished by such transfers have no rights to 
compensation. Furthermore, the death of the testator does not mate-
rially alter their situation. The principal effect of death on the inter-
ests of legal heirs and legatees is to reduce the contingent events that 
may limit or bar altogether their realization of an interest in the de-
cedent's estate. Death itself does not confer such an interest. For the 
legal heirs and legatees, that moment arrives when formal probate 
proceedings have been completed.43 
The logic of our system of succession helps to explain why poten-
tial heirs and legatees hold only expectancies. By establishing a pro-
bate system, the state determines that a decedent's property will pass 
through either testate or intestate succession rules. The universal 
preference is that property be distributed in accordance with the de-
cedent's desires as expressed in a valid will. Failing that, the state's 
alternative method, intestate succession, attempts to follow the dece-
dent's presumed wishes.44 It is important to bear in mind, however, 
that the testate and intestate rules contemplate the transfer of a dece-
dent's property to persons who but for the state's designation would 
have no claim to it on any independent basis of positive law such as 
contract.45 Furthermore, since the state is the source of the property 
right, the preconditions of that right, including the moment of its 
inception, must also be determined by the state. That is, the state 
defines who will succeed to ownership by incorporating the dece-
dent's wishes, expressed or presumed, and further prescribes when 
was frequently expressed in early Supreme Court cases. E.g., Scott v. McNeil, 154 U.S. 34, 49 
(1894); Randall v. Krieger, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 137, 148 (1874). What we suggest is that modern 
due process jurisprudence would also differentiate between those interests. 
42. Standing to attack inter vivos transfers generally is restricted to creditors who claim 
that such transfers are made in fraud of their interests and, less generally, to spouses of trans-
ferors when transfers are made in derogation of marital property rights. Children, except in 
Louisiana, and collateral relatives have no standing as such to attack lifetime transfers as de• 
feating their interests as prospective distributees. See W. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE 
WIDOW'S SHARE 264-67 (1960). 
43. See note 31 supra. 
44. Absent such a scheme, the disposition of property upon the death of the owner would 
impose serious social and legal burdens on the state. See generally Friedman, The Law of t/1e 
Living, The Law of the .Dead: Property, Succession and Society, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 340. 
45. The same, of course, is true of persons who anticipate becoming beneficiaries under 
inter vivos trusts. No property rights in the trust beneficiaries are created until ownership is 
transferred effectively, consistent with conventional property rules. Following such a transfer, 
however, the full procedural protections of Mullane apply. As we shall discuss more fully in 
the text, what distinguishes trust beneficiaries from legal heirs and legatees before the conclu-
sion of probate is present enjoyment of benefits or a presently recognized right to enjoy bene• 
fits in the future. The latter right need not be indefeasibly vested. 
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the rights become fixed. Prior to formal determination of the exist-
ence of a valid will or intestacy, legatees and legal heirs possess noth-
ing more than an expectancy of enrichment. This expectancy may 
be either fulfilled or frustrated, depending upon the outcome of the 
formal inquiry into whether the conditions for inheritance by testate 
or intestate succession have been met. The absence, prior to that 
determination, of any right to present or future possession, use, or 
enjoyment of the property distinguishes probate proceedings for due 
process purposes. Without any apparent exceptions, the Supreme 
Court's procedural due process decisions have involved the judicial 
resolution of disputes concerning preexisting property interests. 
Mullane clearly fits this pattern, as do the more recent debtor-credi-
tor cases.46 
The traditional procedures of American probate do not suggest 
that more than expectancies are involved. Though adjudicative in 
form today, the probate process is not inherently a means of resolv-
ing conflicting property interests. Reduced to fundamentals, the 
state through probate aids individuals in transferring property that is 
indisputably theirs to the objects of their generosity at death. Only 
the cumulative weight of custom and history makes the complete or 
partial abandonment of the adjudicative model a debatable proposi-
tion. Yet if the state can determine to its own satisfaction the testa-
tor's intentions through an ex parte or administrative hearing instead 
of traditional probate, the due process objections raised by heirs or 
legatees should not bar the development of such new formats. While 
notice to affected parties and the opportunity to appear have tradi-
tionally been associated with the adjudicative model of probate pro-
ceedings,47 those procedural incidents are present only because 
legislatures heretofore have elected to use the adversarial system to 
resolve probate questions and because those incidents are implicit in 
the adversarial process.48 They are not a function of the characteri-
zation for due process purposes of the interests of the heirs or the 
legatees. 
The second constitutional objection to our proposal is based on 
the Supreme Court's entitlement cases.49 Until their emergence in 
46. See note 38 supra. See also North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 
(1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
47. In Allan v. Allan, 236 Ga. 199, 223 S.E.2d 445 (1976), the Georgia court held that 
Mullane notice requirements apply only in judicial proceedings that involve binding court 
orders. See generally the discussion in R. WELLMAN, L. WAGGONER & 0. BROWDER, supra 
note 1, at 344-49. 
48. See note 85 i'!fra and accompanying text. 
49. These cases involve both liberty and property interests under the due process clause. 
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the early seventies, it was generally assumed that a state could uni-
laterally revoke any right or benefit that it conferred on its citizens. 
That view was based on the distinction between rights and privi-
leges. Under that distinction, government jobs, licenses, welfare, and 
other state benefits were seen as privileges bestowed out of the gener-
osity of government; since they could be withheld absolutely, it fol-
lowed that they could be conferred upon citizens conditionally even 
though the conditions imposed would violate the Constitution in 
other contexts.so 
In Goldberg v. Kelly,51 the Supreme Court rejected the 
right/privilege distinction as it applied to welfare payments and set 
the stage to reject it for state-conferred entitlements generally. Jus-
tice Brennan noted: "[I]t may be realistic today to regard welfare 
entitlements as more like 'property' than a 'gratuity.' Much of the 
existing wealth in this country takes the form of rights that do not 
fall within traditional common-law concepts of property."52 The 
majority did not question that terminating the plaintiff's right to re-
ceive public assistance extinguished a presently enjoyed property in-
terest. Some of the Court's language, however, stressed the extreme 
importance of welfare payments to the poor,53 an analysis that sug-
gests a potentially narrow scope for the Court's new doctrine. The 
remainder of the Court's opinion in Goldberg centered on the conse-
quences of erroneously halting welfare payments and the need for a 
pretermination hearing to minimize the possibility of error.54 
Although it recognized that entitlements can be property in the 
constitutional sense and hence can merit due process protection, 
Goldberg said little about how one determines whether a relation-
ship between the state and the individual creates a property interest. 
The Supreme Court's seminal decision is Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See also 
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979); Mem• 
phis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977); 
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
50. For a discussion of the development of this doctrine and a critique, see Van Alstyne, 
The .Demise of the Right-Priv,1ege .Distinction in Constitutional Low, 81 HARV. L. Rev. 1439 
(1968). Dissenting in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 353 n.4 (1976), Justice Brennan suggested 
that the Court's current approach to the definition of property for constitutional purposes re-
vives the right/privilege distinction. 
51. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
52. 397 U.S. at 262 n.8. 
53. 397 U.S. at 264. 
54. 397 U.S. at 265-71. The Court's discussion here foreshadowed the more refined em-
phasis in later cases on accuracy and consistency as the paramount purposes of procedural due 
process safeguards. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). This theme in the 
Court's decisions reflects the instrumental view of procedural due process. 
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The Court offered only this unilluminating comment: "The extent to 
which procedural process must be afforded the [welfare] recipient is 
influenced by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer 
grievous loss,' . . . and depends upon whether the recipient's interest 
in avoiding that loss outweighs the government interest in summary 
adjudication."55 
The vagueness of that standard presented no obstacle to the ex-
tension of the Goldberg rationale to the summary suspension of a 
driver's license in Bell v. Burson.56 But in Perry v. Sindermann57 and 
Board of Regents v. Roth,58 due process challenges to the nonrenewal 
of two teaching contracts, the Court held that, before a government 
benefit such as employment can be characterized as property, the 
claimant must establish both a present enjoyment of that benefit and 
a state-induced reliance on its continuation. 59 In both cases, when 
notice of nonrenewal was received, the teachers were enjoying the 
present benefit of a job.60 The entitlement issue therefore turned on 
the presence of some state-induced reliance on continued enjoyment 
of the benefit. In this vein, Sindermann indicates that reliance can be 
shown through the provisions of state law or through understandings 
between the state and the individual that guarantee continued em-
ployment unless cause for dismissal or nonrenewal is demon-
strated. 61 In short, a de facto tenure could be proved even if the 
educational institution purported not to have a tenure system. 62 
Roth involved the nonrenewal of the teaching contract of a proba-
tionary employee holding a tenure track position.63 Neither state 
statute, university rule, nor Roth's contract created any right to re-
55. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970). 
56. 402 U.S. 535 (1971). 
57. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
58. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
59. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 576, 578. 
60. In Roth, the notice ofnonrenewal came during February, the middle of the academic 
year for which the plaintiff held a contract. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 568 
(1972). In Sindermann, notice ofnonrenewal came at the end of the academic year. Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 595 (1972). 
61. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972). 
62. The teacher's contract in Sindermann ran year-to-year, pursuant to a college policy that 
purported to deny any tenure system. In fact, that disclaimer was not as convincing as the 
college may have presumed. The Faculty Guide seemed to deny tenure in one sentence and in 
the next establish the right to "permanent tenure." 408 U.S. at 600. Given the ambiguity of 
the college's official position, the Court turned to substantive contract law for the suggestion of 
an implied agreement or understanding that would rise to a legitimate entitlement of contin-
ued employment Sindermann does not authorize a court to ignore the state's formal rules or 
policies on reemployment whenever it feels that informal practice may depart from them. 
63. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 566-67 (1972). 
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employment beyond the term of the present academic year. 64 The 
fact that most probationary faculty were rehired after the first year 
was insufficient in the Court's view to give Roth a de facto property 
interest: 
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have 
more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a 
unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim 
of entitlement. It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to 
protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reli-
ance that must not be arbitrarily undermined.65 
After Sindermann and Roth, several key generalizations seemed 
possible. First, state rules and understandings determine whether 
employment benefits or other interests conferred by the state on indi-
viduals are constitutionally protected property. Second, present use 
or enjoyment of a benefit without state-induced reliance upon its 
continuation is insufficient to trigger due process safeguards. And 
third, the indeterminant "grievous loss" standard is plainly not a test 
for a constitutionally protected property interest.66 This last aspect 
of the decisions is especially significant since the "grievous loss" 
standard contemplates an aggressive judicial role in determining 
whether or not state benefits are entitlements for due process pur-
poses. 67 
Although the pattern of analysis in Sindermann and Roth basi-
cally continued, two later developments affect the entitlement cases' 
applicability to probate proceedings. First, in Arnett v. Kennedy, 68 
the Court reaffirmed that once the state through positive law or prac-
tice creates an entitlement interest, the adequacy of the procedural 
protection for that interest is determined exclusively by reference to 
constitutional norms.69 Thus, while the state can control whether a 
64. 408 U.S. at 578. 
65. 408 U.S. at 577. 
66. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Court adopted the "grievous loss" 
phraseology that originally appeared in Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Co=. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951). The government's political 
labeling of certain groups in McGrath seriously risked stigmatizing individual group members 
along with other possible consequences such as the loss of job and criminal prosecution. The 
use of the term "grievous loss" to describe these consequences was apt, but scarcely can be 
viewed as an effort by Justice Frankfurter to establish a comprehensive standard for procedu-
ral due process. 
67. With original variations, Professor Tribe has argued the case for an expanded judicial 
role perhaps as forcefully as anyone. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 10-12, at 
532-39 (1978). He gives major credit to Professor Van Alstyne's thinking on the subject, supra 
note 50. 
68. 416 U.S. 134 (1974). 
69. The plurality opinion in this case took the view that the federal government could 
create an entitlement and define the procedural protection to be given to it. 416 U.S. at 152-58. 
Only Justice Rehnquist, the author of the opinion, Chief Justice Burger, and Justice Stewart 
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property interest comes into being, it cannot create an entitlement 
and then anticipate complete judicial deference to its procedural 
safeguards. Second, in Bishop v. Wood,10 the Court clarified the hi-
erarchical inquiry courts must make into state law and practice to 
characterize entitlement interests. If state law on its face or as au-
thoritatively construed by a state court confers no expectancy of a 
permanent job 9r of the receipt of benefits, a federal court must hold 
that no procedural due process protections attach to their termina-
tion.71 Thus, specific state statutes or rules virtually foreclose judi-
cial inquiry into informal practice that might otherwise be reason-
ably viewed as creating a legitimate expectation of entitlement.72 
The argument that the entitlement cases apply to probate has a 
superficial appeal: Succession statutes do explicitly recognize that 
either the legatees under a will or the heirs at law will assume owner-
ship of the decedent's property.73 But obviously, despite such statu-
tory provisions, neither category of potential takers can claim 
present use or enjoyment of the decedent's property. Their interests 
are wholly prospective and lack recognition as existing property 
rights. Indeed, to use the more vivid language of the Supreme Court 
in Roth, their interests represent nothing more than an abstract de-
sire for the decedent's property or a unilateral expectation of a right 
to it.74 For constitutional purposes, a property right arises, if at all, 
when the inquiry into the existence of a valid will has been com-
pleted and the rules of succession have been applied. Only then are 
subscribed to that analysis. The remaining six Justices adhered to the conventional entitle-
ment theory that, while the state is free to define property interests in the first instance, the 
adequacy of the procedural protections given to those interests is a question of constitutional 
law. 416 U.S. at 167, 185, 211. 
70. 426 U.S. 341 (1976). 
71. 426 U.S. at 344-47. The Court in Bishop conceded that the ordinance in question could 
fairly be read as conferring a right to continued employment unless cause for discharge is 
shown. 426 U.S. at 345. It deferred to the federal district judge's interpretation of a North 
Carolina case indicating that an entitlement to continued employment could arise only if 
granted by statute or contract. Otherwise, a public employee served at the pleasure of the 
government. 426 U.S. at 345. The district judge found against the discharged employee on the 
entitlement claim. 426 U.S. at 345. 
72. The Court in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976), explicitly reaffirmed the rule in 
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972), that,a property interest could be created by 
ordinance, rule, or implied contract. Nevertheless, after Bishop it is clear that the reasonable-
ness of expectations will be as much a function of judicial decision as statute, rule, or contrac-
tual provision. As a practical matter, if the law specifically denies creation of an entitlement, 
proof of contrary expectations based on conduct or implied understandings engendered by the 
state will carry no weight. Only the inevitability of flawed draftsmanship gives Sindermann 
any future, however limited it might be. 
13. See notes 30-31 supra and accompanying text. 
74. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
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the prerequisites of the entitlement cases, particularly justifiable reli-
ance, 75 satisfied. Thus, by the criteria of the entitlement cases them-
selves, the claim that procedural due process protections extend to 
probate proceedings - ante-mortem or post-mortem - would ap-
pear to fail.76 
More fundamentally, however, the relevance of the entitlement 
cases to probate seems doubtful. When the state creates an entitle-
ment, it confers upon the private individual a right to receive public 
funds or a right to engage in a business, profession, or other activity 
that is subject to state regulation. The state's role in the succession 
process, however, is quite different. It has merely established alter-
native modes of wealth transmission at death, including inter vivos 
transactions conferring death benefits as well as testate or intestate 
succession, but leaves the choice to the decedent who may or may 
not execute a will. In wealth succession, therefore, the state does not 
confer public benefits upon private individuals for substantive rea-
sons of its own, but rather the state effects an owner's preference as 
to the beneficiaries of personal generosity. Indeed, given a valid will, 
the state takes no interest, save in limited instances such as forced 
share statutes,77 in the identity of devisees or their relationship to the 
testator. Moreover, even when the decedent fails to execute a will 
and the rules of intestate succession apply, the heirs at law share in 
the estate not because they are considered deserving in any substan-
tive sense, but because the distribution comports with the presumed 
intent of the testator. 78 
If, in probate, the state is not creating a new property interest but 
:JS. The Court has consistently required some present legal interest in the entitlement 
cases. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. I, 9, 
10-11 (1979); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 
U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Professor Tribe has challenged the wisdom of that requirement. L. 
TRIBE, supra note 67, § 10-19, at 518-19. But see Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1267, 1296 (1974). 
76.- Despite this conclusion, it would be misleading to describe our proposal as indifferent 
to the interests of expectant heirs or legatees. The question of testamentary capacity is central 
to Anglo-American probate law and for that reason the state has the strongest of interests in its 
accurate resolution. Our proposal recognizes that fact and incorporates two features to pro-
mote the integrity of the factfinding process: (I) an in camera judicial examination of the 
proffered will to uncover possible indications of fraud, undue influence, or testamentary inca-
pacity; and (2) a court-supervised investigation by a guardian ad !item into the circumstances 
of the execution of the will. To the extent that the integrity of the factfinding process is a 
concern of expectant heirs or legatees, these provisions advance their interests, but as an inci-
dental matter only. Nevertheless, if it were necessary to confront the argument directly, the 
recommended safeguards would be stringent enough to satisfy due process standards for ade-
quacy. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. I, 14· 
16 (1979). 
77. See note 126 iefra. 
78. Intestate succession also serves the important state interest in reposing title in property. 
November 1979] Ante-Mortem Probate 109 
rather is formally recognizing the transfer of a preexisting property 
interest from the decedent to other individuals, what is the proper 
conceptualization of the state's role for due process purposes? Under 
this transactional approach, the state and the decedent act coopera-
tively. If the state is satisfied that it is carrying out the testator's 
wishes - in other words, that a valid will exists in cases where this 
route has been selected - that should conclude the matter since all 
the parties necessary to transfer the property interests affected by 
probate are represented. Probate can therefore be purely adminis-
trative or ex parte. Legatees and heirs may be keenly interested ob-
servers, but that does not give them a right to participate in the 
proceeding that determines the validity of the will. 
Under the entitlement cases, the state has the power to identify 
what event brings entitlement interests into being. The distinction 
between probationary and permanent employees accepted in Roth is 
illustrative.79 New faculty members were hired from year to year 
until granted tenure, at which point they could be dismissed only for 
cause. The Court did not question that the timing of the transforma-
tion from abstract desire to legitimate claim of entitlement was whol-
ly within the control of the state. If one assumes that the interests of 
legatees or heirs must eventually become constitutionally protected 
property, the Constitution in no way prevents the state from placing 
the critical instant of recognition at some point after the inquiry into 
the will's validity. 
To complete our evaluation of probate procedure in light of the 
entitlement cases, we should briefly comment on one particular 
scholarly criticism of the Supreme Court's entitlement cases since 
Roth:80 the Court's lack of sensitivity to so-called intrinsic values 
implicit in the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
79. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 566-68 (1972). See also note 38 supra. 
80. The literature reviewing and criticizing the Supreme Court's current approach to pro-
cedural due process issues is plentiful. One recent effort is Saphire, Spec!Jj,ing JJue Process 
Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111 
(1978). Other important contributions include: Christie, Injury to Reputation and the Constitu-
tion: Coefusion and Co,iflicting Approaches, 15 MICH. L. REV. 43 (1976); Friendly, supra note 
75; Grey, Property and Need· The We!fare State and Theories of Distributive Justice, 28 STAN. 
L. REV. 877 (1976); Mashaw, The Supreme Court's JJue Process Calculus far Administrative 
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 28 (1976); Monaghan, Of"Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1977); 
Rabin, Job Security and JJue Process: Administrative JJiscretion Through a Reasons Require-
ment, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 60 (1976); Tribe, Structural JJue Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 269 (1975); Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property'~· Adjudicative JJue Process in the 
Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445 (1977); Co=ent, Entitlement, Enjoyment, and 
JJue Process of Law, 1974 DUKE L.J. 89; Note, Spec!Jj,ing the Procedures Required by Pue 
Process: Towards Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1975). 
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ments.81 Although the currently pred_ominant instrumental values -
accuracy and consistency in factfinding - are acknowledged as fun-
damental to procedural due process, it is argued that another, 
equally fundamental value demands recognition: the protection of 
personal dignity.82 Procedurally, this means personal participation 
in government decisions that may affect an individual's interests ad-
versely and reasons for any completed decision. 83 
Commentators have offered two responses to protect these intrin-
sic concerns, neither of which·warrants requiring extensive procedu-
ral deference to prospective heirs or legatees. First, some suggest a 
dramatic broadening of the property notion to include all state-in-
duced expectations. 84 But proponents of this approach seem to re-
quire a deprivation by the state of some currently held interest, no 
matter how tenuous or ephemeral, to trigger due process safeguards. 
As we have argued, probate deprives heirs and legatees of nothing; it 
merely investigates the existence of a valid will. The transfer of a 
decedent's property - the sine qua non for due process protection -
occurs after probate and is a function of its outcome. The second 
protection for intrinsic values detaches procedural due process -
notably the principle of personal participation - from the property 
limitation entirely. The right to personal participation is seen as a 
substantive aspect of personal liberty under the due process clause 
and hence is a procedural protection that must be available when-
ever the state acts to "dispose of an individual situation" or "does the 
individual grievous harm."85 This theory may well embrace probate 
proceedings, but its anomalous aspects limit its persuasiveness. The 
theory lacks a confining analytic framework. Without such bounds, 
state proceedings could be deemed to affect so many people that vir-
tually everyone would be entitled to receive notice. Beyond the ob-
vious monetary costs, ubiquitous notice would lose any capacity to 
81. The basic summary of these arguments is drawn from L. TRIBE, supra note 67, §§ 10-7 
to 10-19, at 501-63. 
82. See id. § 10-7, at 501-06. 
83. See id.§§ 10-12 & 10-13, at 532-43. 
84. Tribe attributes this view to Van Alstyne based on the latter's article. Id. at 483-87. A 
number of commentators have been critical of Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), and other 
entitlement cases, yet have not urged the abandonment of property as a limitation on procedu-
ral due process. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 80, at 434-44. See generally P. BATOR, P. 
MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 500-02 (2d ed. 1973). 
The cases most closely exemplifying this approach would be Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 
(1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); and Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp, 395 U.S. 
337 (1969). ~ 
85. L. TRIBE, supra note 67, § 10-12, at 538-39. 
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evoke a response.86 Moreover, this second theory finds acceptance 
exclusively in scholarly circles; no court has adopted it. 
In reviewing this Section, recall that our analysis of the due proc-
ess requirements for ante-mortem probate does not rest on a differ-
entiation between ante-mortem and post-mortem probate. Although 
a factual distinction might be drawn between the ante-mortem and 
post-mortem interests of the legal heirs and legatees, it would de-
pend solely on the relative reduction in contingencies that could ter-
minate those interests. Surely a greater number of contingencies can 
affect the interests of heirs and legatees before the testator's death 
than after; but, just as surely, many contingencies remain after the 
death as probate proceeds. Such a relative, marginal reduction in 
the probability of inheritance provides an insufficient basis for con-
stitutional distinction. Heirs and legatees hold no certain interests 
until the state completes its supervisory role in probate, and the ap-
plicability of due process safeguards should not hinge on the re-
moval of only one of many potential contingencies in the state's final 
determination. Consequently, we treat the constitutional question in 
the ante- and post-mortem settings as identical. Our analysis not 
only clears the way for a no-notice version of ante-mortem probate, 
but also clarifies the constitutional question for the no-notice feature 
adopted in the Uniform Probate Code87 and other probate reform 
efforts. The no-notice ante-mortem probate proceedings suggested 
in this Article represent a prime example of what might come. 88 
III. IMPLEMENTING THE ADMINISTRATIVE MODEL 
After considering the merits of a binding, no-notice version of 
86. For a discussion of the consequences of the overuse of Mullane notice requirements in 
the probate context, see R. WELLMAN, L. WAGGONER & 0. BROWDER, supra note 1, at 349-50. 
81. See note 26 supra. 
88. Our analysis suggests that the format for probate is a policy choice for the state; it can 
be administrative, ex parte, or traditionally adjudicative. But critically, American probate pro-
cedure largely results from a general preference for the adjudicative model. That model im-
plies the presence of adversary parties, the development of a factual basis for each position, 
and a decision by the trier of fact on the validity of the proffered will. Having committed the 
will to this process, it would be anomalous for the state to notify the legatees under a proffered 
will and not the heirs at law who could be expected to challenge it. Thus, the traditional 
probate notice requirements may originate not from due process fairness concerns, but from 
the equal protection notion of treating similarly situated parties similarly. The parallel be-
tween due process and equal protection analysis is particularly close when a classification re-
stricts the availability or exercise of procedural rights within the judicial system. Compare the 
majority and dissenting opinions in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). See also Ross 
v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 609-18 (1974); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74-79 (1972). A similar 
parallel can be seen in the Supreme Court's cases involving equal access to the courts. Bounds 
v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Ortein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); United States v. Kras, 
409 U.S. 434 (1973); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
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ante-mortem probate and eliminating the constitutional objections to 
such a reform, we are in a position to formulate its design. Essen-
tially our proposal contemplates a two-part scheme: enactment of 
the ante-mortem statute itself and revision of the statutory condi-
tions on the right to contest. The format outlined here is by no 
means the exclusive route to binding, no-notice, ante-mortem pro-
bate, and we shall incidentally mention alternative provisions of 
varying attractiveness. 
A. The Proposed Administrative Format 
The basic statute would retain many of the features suggested by 
Professor Langbein, especially the guardian ad litem, but would re-
spond to the criticisms made earlier by modifying his model in sev-
eral important respects. Most fundamentally, our proposal 
reformulates the procedure for ante-mortem determinations. Dis-
cussions of ante-mortem probate, including Langbein's, have thus 
far conceived of the procedure as an accelerated will contest, 89 an 
adversarial adjudication of a, dispute. As we discussed in Section II, 
that format normally entails notice requirements and participatory 
rights. Langbein's model tempers the adversarial nature of the pro-
cedure through the guardian ad litem, but his proposal is still wed-
ded to an adjudicative design. Our alternative is an administrative 
proceeding, neither adjudicative nor adversarial. It is not an acceler-
ated will contest, but rather an ex parte proceeding in which the state 
satisfies its interest in certain factual conditions of testate succession. 
The proceedings could be patterned along the following outline. 
I. Initiation 
As with the Langbein model, ante-mortem probate would be ini-
tiated with a petition to the conservatorship court90 for a declaration 
that the testator duly executed the will,91 possessed the requisite ca-
pacity,92 and was free from undue influence. The petition would 
also include the will that the petitioner wishes to certify, so that the 
89. Langbein, supra note 2, at 74. 
90. Jurisdiction over conservatorship usually is vested in the court having jurisdiction over 
probate matters, whether that is a specialized court or one of general jurisdiction. In a few 
states, however, concurrent jurisdiction is exercised by equity courts. 
91. Generally, the petition would allege that the will is in writing, was signed by the peti-
tioner (or by some other person in the petitioner's presence and by the petitioner's direction), 
and was signed by two witnesses in the presence of the petitioner. See generally Rees, Ameri-
can Wills Statutes, 46 VA. L. REV. 613 (1960). 
We agree with Langbein, supra note 2, at 77 n.48, that there is no reason for requiring in-
court execution of the will. 
92. See generally T. ATKINSON, supra note 16, §§ 50-55. 
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trier may determine aspects of capacity, especially lack of undue in-
fluence, that depend on the specific testamentary disposition at is-
sue.93 To assure confidentiality of the testamentary plan, however, 
the will should be inspected only by the trier; in camera. Such lim-
ited access to the will does not impede the investigation of capacity, 
and it corresponds to the procedure followed in other contexts where 
confidentiality of documents is vital.94 
2. The Guardian Ad Litem 
The court would immediately appoint a guardian ad litem. Al-
though we endorse Langbein's guardian concept, we conceive of the 
guardian's role differently. Rather than representing, as a court-ap-
pointed fiduciary, all individuals holding potential property inter-
ests,95 the guardian would act under our model as the court's agent. 
Consistent with our nonadversarial procedure, the guardian should 
not represent any individual interests in the proceeding; our ante-
mortem probate model does not resolve conflicting individual 
claims, but rather determines facts important to the state. The 
guardian in ante-mortem probate should be more closely analogous 
to a court-appointed special master than to the representative of a 
class of claimants.96 Like a special master, the guardian would be 
accountable to the court. Nevertheless, the guardian who acts mali-
ciously or for an improper purpose may be held liable to individuals, 
including expectant heirs, who can prove damage as a result of that 
breach of public duty.97 
The guardian's responsibility should extend to interviewing the 
93. See id. § 55, at 255-56. 
94. Both the Freedom of Information Act and the Federal Privacy Act include procedures 
for ex parte court determination on the substance of claims disclosure. If the federal govern-
ment claims in a Freedom of Information Act suit, for example, that a document is exempt 
from disclosure, the court examines the document in camera to segregate exempt from nonex-
empt portions. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976). A similar procedure is followed in requests for 
access under the Federal Privacy Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(g)(3)(A) (1976). 
95. See Langbein, J11pra note 2, at 78. 
96. Masters, special masters, receivers, auditors, and assessors are among the many labels 
for court-appointed, specialized, nonjudicial personnel whose roots extend back to early Eng-
lish equity practice. Today, their functions, which have varied substantially over time, are 
usually defined by statute. See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. 53; GA. CODE ANN.§§ 10-101 through 
-104 (1973). For a discussion of the flexible role of masters and their use in recent litigation, 
see Brakel, Special Masters in Institutional Litigation, 1979 A.B.F. Res. J. 543. 
97. The extent of a guardian's potential liability would depend, of course, on local state 
law concerning the scope of immunity for public officials. Generally, however, it seems likely 
that a guardian, acting as a lower administrative officer, would be liable only if he acted mali-
ciously or for an improper purpose. That is, he would not be liable if he acted honestly and in 
good faith. See w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 989 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D (1979). 
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testator (without the presence of the attorney who prepared the 
will),98 members of the family, and other relatives and friends who 
could provide evidence bearing on undue influence and capacity. 
Based on those interviews, the guardian would report to the court 
concerning probable undue influence and capacity. This limited 
scope of responsibility should remove any disincentive to serve as 
guardian that might accompany fiduciary obligations to explore 
every possible suggestion of invalidity.99 At the same time, there 
would be adequate opportunity for evidence of testamentary defects, 
especially if the court can question the testator and members of the 
nuclear family. 100 
Unlike Langbein, we do not contemplate informing the guardian 
of the will's contents, though the court might be given discretion to 
do so. The reason for this restriction is, again, to guard the confiden-
tiality of the testator's wishes. Unlike the trier, who must make the 
ultimate findings on capacity, the guardian has no responsibilities 
that necessarily demand knowledge of the will's contents. Rather, 
the guardian investigates the testator's capacity generally, and 
should investigate no less vigorously or effectively when ignorant of 
the will's specific terms. 101 Admittedly, the conventional view sug-
gests that reference to specific testamentary dispositions is essential 
to determine capacity, and undue influence especially, because the 
presence of an unusual bequest signals possible impropriety or other 
incapacity.102 But the court, which will have access to the document 
and hence be aware of any extraordinary dispositions, can alert the 
guardian to inquire into specific matters bearing on such dispositions 
without disclosing the terms. Following that court supervision, the 
guardian's interviews and personal evaluation should fully enable 
the trier to determine testamentary capacity. 
98. Although we agree with Professor Langbein that individuals who wish to use the ante-
mortem procedure should be required to be represented by counsel, we suggest that the attor• 
ney responsible for the will not be present when the testator is interviewed by the guardian ad 
litem. Generally, representation by counsel seems unnecessary, given the nonadversarial na-
ture of the proceeding. The guardian will be subject to the constant supervision of the court, 
adequately protecting the testator's interests. Furthermore, by using tactics that are character-
istic of adversary proceedings, an attorney, particularly one who has participated in the prepa-
ration of the will, might threaten the informal character of the procedure and burden the 
exchange between testator and guardian. 
99. See Alexander, supra note 6, at 89 n.12. 
100. See notes 126-30 infra and accompanying text. 
101. Defining and limiting the guardian's responsibilities in this way may also respond to 
common criticisms from the estate planning bar, charging conflicts of interest and other abuses 
by guardians ad litem. See Goldstein, Once More, Surrogate Talk, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1977, 
§ 4, at 5, col. 1. 
102. See Green, Proof o:f Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major Premise, 53 
YALE L.J. 271, 301-02 (1944). 
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3. Notice and Hearing 
Notice and opportunity to appear in the proceeding would be 
provided more restrictively than in the Langbein model. 103 As we 
have seen, expectant heirs and legatees have no constitutional right 
to notice, and strong practical reasons militate against giving notice 
to more remote expectant heirs. Beyond the guardian ad litem, no-
tice should not be required for any other individual, not even for 
members of the testator's nuclear family whose interests are constitu-
tionally indistinguishable from those of more remote heirs. For rea-
sons that will be developed later, 104 a state might choose to exempt 
the nuclear family from the binding effects of the ante-mortem pro-
ceeding. Under such an exemption, they would be unaffected by the 
determination, and there would be even less reason to r~quire formal 
notice. 
Dispensing with notice - effectively rendering the ante-mortem 
hearing an ex parte proceeding - is not completely without prece-
dent or analogy. Two states currently permit residents to amend the 
plan of intestate succession prescribed by descent and distribution 
statutes. 105 Under those designated-heir statutes, any competent per-
son106 may file a written statement with the court declaring that a 
designated person shall be deemed the declarant's heir at law for 
succession of wealth. Although the legislative history of the acts 
demonstrate that their original purpose was to authorize a circum-
vention of statutory bars against inheritance by illegitimate children, 
both statutes have been interpreted to permit designation of any in-
dividual, regardless of age or relationship to the declarant, as heir at 
law. 107 Despite the obvious effect such a proceeding has on the re-
103. Our model differs as well from the notice provisions in U.P.C. conservatorship proce-
dure. See note 20 supra. 
104. See notes 126-30 infra and accompanying text. 
105. ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 61-301 (1947); 0Hl0 REV. CODE ANN.§ 2105.15 (Page 1976). 
106. The Ohio statute provides that the designator must be a person "of sound mind and 
memory," and it provides that the court must determine whether the declarant is of sound 
mind and is acting free of restraint. OHlO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.15 (Page 1976). That 
language otherwise tracks the standard for testamentary competence provided in OHlo REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2107.02 (1976), except that the latter statute specifically provides that minors 
lack testamentary capacity while the designated-heir statute is silent on the point. 
107. The Arkansas statute, first enacted in 1853, was originally titled "An act to authorize 
and prescribe the manner by which persons in this State may adopt illegitimate children and 
others, and make them their Heirs at Law." Act of Jan. 12, 1853, § 1 [1853] Ark. Acts, quoted 
in Reed v. Billingslea, 226 Ark. 489,489, 291 S.W.2d 497, 497 (1956), where the court noted 
that although the specific intent of the statute was directed at legitimating bastards for inheri-
tance purposes, the statute in fact authorized the designation of anyone as a legal heir. The 
Ohio statute similarly originated as an adoption statute, but no special relationship or age is 
specified as a requirement. See In re Estate of Gompf, 175 Ohio St. 400, 194 N.E.2d 806 
(1964). 
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maining expectant heirs at law - those whose heirship status derives 
from the statutes of descent and distribution - neither of the desig-
nated-heir statutes requires that notice be given to any person. 108 
They require only a determination by the court that the declarant is 
of sound mind and is acting voluntarily. The designation proceeding 
consequently amounts to an ex parte exercise of testamentary au-
thority.109 
The designated-heir procedure has limits, however, that prevent 
it from being a complete answer to the problem of will contests. For 
example, the designated heir may receive nothing if the year's allow-
ance or the surviving spouse's exempted share consumes the entire 
estate. Furthermore, the designation is not absolutely binding: It 
may be set aside on the same grounds that are available in a will 
contest, although given the judicial participation in the designation, 
challenges are unlikely to succeed. 110 Nevertheless, the statutes do 
provide a precedent for ex parte ante-mortem probate. The desig-
nated-heir statutes attempt to accommodate the same objectives -
confidentiality and security - as our proposal. 111 
4. Order and the Right to Contest 
If the court were persuaded of the petition's accuracy, it would 
issue an order declaring that the will has been duly executed and is 
free from testamentary defects. To ensure that this determination 
will be conclusive, the existing statutes providing the right to contest 
at post-mortem probate proceedings should be amended. Typically, 
108. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-302 (1947) provides, however, that the designation shall not 
become effective until recorded. The result is that, although no notice need be given to the 
other heir at law or to the designee, the transaction is a matter of public record. 
Recording is not required under the Ohio statute, but the court must keep a record of the 
proceeding. The no-notice feature of the proceeding was recognized and sustained in Bird v. 
Young, 56 Ohio St. 210, 46 N.E. 819 (1897), and Laws v. Davis, 34 Ohio App. 157, 170 N.E. 
601 (1929). 
109. Horine v. Horine, 16 Ohio L. Abs. 155 (1934). Under the Ohio statute, the designa-
tion of an heir may be set aside on the same grounds that are available in will contests: inca-
pacity and undue influence. However, the designation seems less vulnerable than a will since 
an attack against the probate judge's order must be levelled in the same court that granted the 
order. 
At least in Ohio, the designation ofheirship procedure has been used as one of the princi-
pal methods of securing protection against post-mortem will contests. Rippner, Wills Can Be 
Made" Unbreakable," 6 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 336, 337-42 (1957). The testator may designate 
as an heir any beneficiary under the will. If the will is subsequently set aside, the designated 
heir still inherits as a child of the decedent. 
110. Another limitation on the designation route is the possibility that the declarant may 
have made a will prior to the one under attack. If the designated heir is not provided for in 
that will and it is admitted to probate, the designated heir would not be protected. 
111. One other similarity between the designation procedure and ante-mortem probate is 
the absence of any jury role in the court's approval of an exercise of testamentary authority. 
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those statutes restrict contests to "interested"112 or "aggrieved"113 
persons, and courts generally hold that the limiting language refers 
to those individuals who have some legal or equitable property inter-
est that would be adversely affected by the will's validity.114 The 
existence of an adverse property interest does not necessarily entail, 
however, a constitutional right to contest. The authority to contest is 
purely statutory, 115 and it may be - and has been 116 - modified 
and limited by subsequent legislative measures. Like statutes of de-
scent and distribution, many of which have been altered to reduce 
the range of potential heirs, 117 statutes authorizing will contests 
could be amended to make the ante-mortem determination binding 
at the post-mortem stage on all persons except those specifically 
granted the right to contest. The authorizing statute would specifi-
cally prohibit post-mortem contest actions against wills that have 
been certified in ante-mortem probate. Heirs at law and disap-
pointed legatees need not be given an opportunity to contest because, 
again, their interests, being only derivative of the testator's, are 
bound by the testator's actions. 118 They possess no independent 
property interests and consequently no constitutional right to chal-
lenge. However, for prudential reasons that we shall examine 
later, 119 a state might extend authority to contest at post-mortem 
proceedings to members of the testator's nuclear family. 
Although this is a substantial restriction of the authority to con-
test, we leave unaltered the conventional exception for persons in-
jured by fraud in the probate proceedings. Probate decrees 
ordinarily may be set aside after a showing of fraud upon the 
court, 120 and relief would continue to be available in post-mortem 
112. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 90 (1973). 
113. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-288 (West 1958). 
114. See, e.g., Bazo v. Siegel, 48 Ohio St. 2d 353, 390 N.E.2d 807 (1979). 
115. See, e.g., Doran v. Wurth, 475 S.W.2d 49, 50-51 (Mo. 1971); Dibble v. Winter, 247 Ill. 
243, 252, 93 N.E. 145, 149 (1910). 
l 16. See, e.g., McQueen v. Conner, 385 Ill. 455, 53 N.E.2d 435 (1944). 
117. Influenced by MODEL PROBATE CODE, supra note 1, § 22(b), a number of states 
amended their statutes of descent to limit the outer range of heirs to the descendants of the 
decedent's grandparents. Earlier statutes had permitted relatives tracing through more remote 
ascendants. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-l(c)(6) (Bums 1976) (enacted 1955, amending Law of 
May 14, 1852, ch. 27, § 5, 1852 IND. R.Ev. STAT. 248-49). See Simes, The Indiana Probate Code 
and the Model Probate Code: A Comparison, 29 IND. L.J. 34 (1954). U.P.C. § 2-103 follows 
that trend. 
118. The notion of binding derivative interests and denying subsequent opportunity to 
challenge determinations finds analogies in other areas, such as divorce. See Johnson v. 
Meulberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951). 
119. See notes 126-30 iefra and accompanying text. 
120. T. ATKINSON, supra note 16, § 96, at 500. For a recent case discussing "extrinsic 
fraud," see Ivancovich v. Meier, 595 P.2d 24, 26-27 (Ariz. 1979). 
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proceedings by the heirs. Their standing to raise such matters de-
rives from the testator's right to raise them, and they are bound by 
the ante-mortem determination to the same extent as the testator. 
Since the testator would not be bound by a proceeding that was 
fraudulently induced, the heirs may raise the matter during post-
mortem proceedings to probate the will. 121 Although the heirs could 
not challenge any ante-mortem determinations regarding formalities 
of execution, capacity, undue influence, and any other issue that 
could have been raised ante-mortem, they would retain access to the 
traditional remedies for fraudulent concealment of evidence of inva-
lidity, including equitable relief through a constructive trust. 122 
Such evidence of invalidity, which there was no opportunity to pre-
sent earlier, is not subject to the usual rules of res judicata, and our 
proposed restraint on standing to contest would not affect those es-
tablished principles. 123 
5. Revocation 
The prediction 124 that testators who use ante-mortem probate 
will rarely wish to revoke or modify their certified wills may well 
hold true. Nevertheless, we want to be clear about the availability of 
revocation and its procedure if only to avoid the appearance of mak-
ing the will irrevocable through court approval. 
Three alternative rules on revoking a will that is probated ante-
mortem are plausible. First, purely informal revocation of the will 
121. Effectuating the testator's presumed interest in remedying fraud should not lead to a 
broader exception for post-mortem challenges to an ante-mortem determination of validity, 
That interest is already accommodated through the work of the guardian ad litem and the 
court's supervision. The concern for fraud on the court is not satisfied by those features, how-
ever, and permitting heirs to raise such objections after death is necessary to respond to that 
concern. 
122. U.P.C. § 1-106 similarly retains "[t]he usual rules for securing relief for fraud on a 
court." U.P.C. § 1-106, Comment. 
123. Relief may be granted, notwithstanding a decree of probate, where, for example, a 
beneficiary who knows of other legal heirs fails to disclose their existence to the probate court, 
e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 17 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1927); In re Bailey's Estate, 205 Wis. 648, 238 
N.W. 845 (1931); In re O'Neil, 55 Conn. 409, 11 A. 857 (1887); or alleged in a petition for 
probate that the decedent left no heirs, e.g., Zaremba v. Woods, 17 Cal. App. 2d 309, 61 P.2d 
976 (1936); Weyant v. Utah Sav. & Trust Co., 54 Utah 181, 182 P. 189 (1919); Annot., 113 
A.L.R. 1235 (1938). A constructive-trust remedy has also been held available where the sole 
beneficiary under a will, who was the putative surviving spouse of the decedent, effectively 
prevented a legal heir of the decedent from contesting the will on the grounds of fraud and 
undue influence by deliberately concealing her true identity and prior marital status. Caldwell 
v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471, 23 P.2d 758 (1933). Other instances of fraud on the court that have 
warranted setting aside a decree of probate include destruction of subsequent wills by the 
executor or a beneficiary under the probated will. Ellis v. Schwank, 37 Wash. 2d 286, 223 P.2d 
448 (1950), noted in 50 MICH. L. REV. 348 (1951). 
124. Langbein, supra note 2, at 81. 
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might be permitted; that is, the testator could subsequently revoke 
the approved will without even notifying the court that approved it. 
Second, at the opposite extreme, revocation might require formal ac-
tion requesting judicial approval of the revocation or modifica-
tion.125 Finally, we might steer a course between no judicial 
participation and formal supervision by requiring only that notice of 
the revocation or the modification be submitted to the court. 
That statement of the alternatives reveals our preference for the 
third position. Requiring some formality assures that the testator se-
riously intends the change, but limiting that formality keeps the cost 
of the procedure under control and thus eliminates a potential disin-
centive to ante-mortem probate. Court-supervised revocation and 
alteration would impose such a disincentive on any persons consid-
ering ante-mortem probate who value continued flexibility for their 
testamentary plans. The simple notice requirement is a satisfactory 
compromise between protection and flexibility. 
B. Policy Considerations: Excepting the Nuclear Family 
Through the foregoing account of the procedure for ante-mortem 
probate, we suggested that members of the nuclear family might be 
excepted from the operation of the ante-mortem proceeding. Specifi-
cally, notice might be given to the testator's spouse and children, and 
they might be authorized to appear in the hearing. They might also 
be given the right to contest at post-mortem proceedings. We em-
phasized that such exceptions for the nuclear family are not constitu-
tionally compelled; nonetheless, prudential concerns might move a 
legislature to adopt them. In this Section, we explore the arguments 
for the nuclear-family exception. We find that the original concern 
that prompted the proposal in earlier drafts of a Uniform Ante-
Mortem Probate Act loses force in our procedural context, and hence 
we reject the exception. 
A nuclear-family exception would limit the scope of our ante-
mortem probate system, continuing the preferential treatment that 
the common law has traditionally accorded family property mat-
ters.126 The exemption distinguishes between those expectant heirs 
125. The North Dakota statute adopts this position. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.1-03 
(Supp. 1977). 
126. Most states have enacted, for example, forced share statutes that guarantee the surviv-
ing spouse a portion of the decedent's estate. R. WELLMAN, L. WAGGONER & 0. BROWDER, 
supra note 1, at 354. Although there is generally no comparable protection against disinheri-
tance for the testator's children, nearly all states have enacted pretermitted-heir statutes to 
protect children from unintended disinheritance. Id at 351. Family-maintenance legislation 
is generally discussed in Le Van, Alternatives to Forced Heirship, 52 TuL. L. REv. 29 (1977). 
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who are the closest to the testator, ie., the nuclear family, and re-
mote heirs. Although close family members, as expectant heirs, pos-
sess no property interests for constitutional purposes, they do have a 
somewhat stronger claim to protection based on their financial de-
pendence on the testator. The need for support, of course, cannot be 
determined until the testator's death, and thus the probability of de-
pendence by the nuclear family gradually falls as the testator grows 
older. Nevertheless, heirs within the nuclear family are much more 
likely to depend on support from the testator's legacy than are re-
mote heirs. Of course, not all nuclear families will be dependent on 
the testator, 127 but if a state adopts the exception, nuclear-family 
members should not have to prove dependence to participate in the 
~roceeding. Exceptions to the presumption of dependence do not 
make a distinction between the immediate family and remote heirs 
irrational. That presumption possesses sufficient empirical validity 
to render the nuclear family a legitimate legislative classification. 128 
Moreover, the nuclear-family exception not only remedies actual 
dependence but also protects the expectation of support that mem-
bers of the testator's family may have. It assures those persons clos-
est to the testator that they suffer no risk of financial deprivation 
from ante-mortem probate. Other substantive rules limiting freedom 
of testation recognize the legitimacy of such expectations. 129 To as-
sure protection of the family's expectations, a state might choose not 
to enable testators to bind their dependents by a judicial proceed-
ing130 that they have no opportunity to participate in or challenge 
later. 
Despite those admitted advantages of a nuclear-family exception, 
we ultimately conclude that it should not be implemented. For, bal-
anced against the policy considerations just mentioned, the nuclear-
127. Dependence will vary even within families. As the testator advances in age, the chil-
dren are less likely to be dependent than the surviving spouse. But again, as against remote 
heirs, the probability of dependence by all family heirs is sufficiently high to justify the distinc-
tion between family and remote heirs. Moreover, further refinements might be suggested 
through experience; for example, a state may choose to exempt only the spouse. 
128. Forced share statutes similarly create a legislative classification that is premised on 
the general social experience of dependence by surviving spouses. See Haskell, Reslrai11/s 
Upon the IJisinherila11ce of Family Members, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 105, 
110-14, 116-18 (E. Halbach ed. 1977); Haskell, The Premarital Es/ale Co11/racl and Social Pol-
icy, 57 N.C. L. Rev. 415, 423--27 (1979). 
129. See note 126 supra. 
130. We do not mean to attack the revocable inter vivos trust as a device used to defraud 
family Il!embers. Whether such trusts ought to be subject to the same limitations against disin-
heritance that apply to testamentary devices is a much larger issue than that involved in our 
discussion. It is sufficient to note that, although successful attacks on revocable living trusts 
are relatively infrequent, they are possible where the property interests of a surviving spouse 
are at stake. See Schuyler, supra note 23, ~ 74.1301. 
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family exception would partially sacrifice the objective of no-notice 
ante-mortem probate: security with confidentiality. To maximize 
the efficacy of ante-mortem probate, no exception should be made 
for any category of expectant heirs. The nuclear-family exception is 
especially unjustifiable in the context of an administrative, 
nonadversarial procedure such as we propose. The exception was 
originally suggested for a proposed ante-mortem procedure using the 
adversarial format of a declaratory judgment proceeding. In that 
context, the exception was a justifiable effort to avoid the undesirable 
effects of casting closely related family members as adversaries. If 
the testator's immediate family were removed from the operation of 
the ante-mortem proceeding, such a procedure would not threaten 
family harmony and consequently would be more attractive to testa-
tors. But when the procedure makes an administrative, nonadver-
sarial determination, the threat of an unseemly spectacle between 
family members is removed, and the gap in protection against post-
mortem attack is no longer justified. 
Protecting the testator's spouse against disinheritance, which may 
also prompt the nuclear-family exception, is better accommodated 
by forced share or other family-maintenance legislation. Forced 
share statutes provide a more direct method of responding to spousal 
disinheritance and would probably impair the testator's plan less se-
riously than a post-mortem attack upon the will. Finally, the excep-
tion would risk converting an administrative, nonadversarial 
proceeding into an adversarial adjudication. To maintain a rela-
tively simple ante-mortem determination of capacity, we reject any 
nuclear-family exception from the operation of the ante-mortem 
probate. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The strong movement of modem succession law toward probate 
alternatives has resulted, in general terms, from the delay and cost of 
probate. Various innovations have been introduced to eliminate 
probate's disincentives and thereby to restore probate as the primary 
institutional means of wealth succession.131 The reasons for this goal 
131. The Uniform Probate Code incorporates a variety of features that are directed at 
motives for avoiding probate. See generally U.P.C. art. 2, pt. 5, General Comment. Among 
these are changes in formal requirements for executing wills, including a liberalized provision 
on holographic wills, see U.P.C. § 2-503; limitations on opportunities for attacks on wills by 
disinherited spouses, see U.P.C. art. 2, pt. 2, and afterbom or omitted children or grandchil-
dren, see U.P.C. §§ 2-108, 2-302; and opportunities to avoid court supervision through infor-
mal probate and informal appointment of personal representatives, see U.P.C. art. 3, pt. 3. 
Furthermore, recently offered proposals, especially one that would require only substantial 
compliance with the formalities of execution, should also reduce the unattractiveness of the 
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will not be detailed here; one need only draw attention, however, to 
the disadvantages of many of the more common will substitutes to 
suggest why probate avoidance is an undesirable development. Joint 
ownership of property with a survivorship feature, for example, is 
flawed by its attendant diminution in control and increased risk of 
loss of private management ability.132 More generally, a highly dif-
fused, non-orderly system of wealth distribution obviously in-
troduces costs that do not pr_evail under probate's orderly, unified 
system. 
Along with other recently developed procedures, ante-mortem 
probate may play a significant role in the restoration of the probate 
process. It effectively removes one of the specific disincentives to us-
ing the probate system, namely, the threat of compromise-seeking 
will contests. Its efficacy in that role, however, depends heavily upon 
its format. If developed according to the conventional adjudicative 
design with broad provision for notice and opportunity to appear, 
ante-mortem probate will probably have only a slight effect, as testa-
tors are deterred from using it by its costs and by the loss of privacy. 
We hope to have provided an alternative format that avoids these 
costs and enhances its prospects for success as a probate-revitalizing 
device. 
Beyond this immediate objective, we hope to have incidentally 
aided other efforts at reforming the probate process by clarifying the 
constitutional due process limitations on probate procedures. Pro-
bate has been made unattractive in part by its formality, which ag-
gravates delay and costs, and many of the recent changes in the 
probate system have been aimed at reducing the level of formal-
ity.133 The indiscriminate imposition of procedural due process pro-
visions will seriously impair the development of new, efficient 
systems for transferring wealth at death. We have attempted to dis-
tinguish between those situations in which due process features are 
constitutionally compelled and those in which the procedural re-
straints may be dispensed with. Such potential simplification of pro-
bate should decelerate the rush to probate alternatives. 
formal probate process. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV, L. 
REV. 489 (1975). 
132. R. WELLMAN, L. WAGGONER & 0. BROWDER, supra note 1, at 13. 
133. See U.P.C. art. 2, pt. 5, General Comment. 
